Witryna15 wrz 2007 · A third, intermediate, treatment allows for imperfect demand information (as in Green and Porter) but perfect monitoring (as in Rotemberg and Saloner). Results indicate that for a sufficiently high discount rate, demand information seems to facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. Witryna1 lip 2002 · It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a …
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public ...
WitrynaImperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study by Attila Ambrus and Ben Greiner. Published in volume 102, issue 7, pages 3317-32 of American Economic Review, December 2012, Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooper... WitrynaThe monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria … lyrics kate bush wuthering heights
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships - JSTOR
Witryna1 gru 2024 · This reasoning suggests three factors that shape the impact of monitoring on the trust of followers. First, the deliberate choice of monitoring as an instrument; second, the actual monitoring; and third, the expectation of consequences if undesired behavior has been monitored. Witryna1 lis 2024 · If the probability goes to zero, then the firm’s reputation collapses. Imperfect monitoring means that even if consumers find that the product generates a bad … Witryna1 cze 1986 · JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 39, 251-269 (1986) Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring* DIMP ABREU Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts DAVID PEARCE Yale University, Cowles Foundation, P. 0. Box 2125, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 AND ENNIO STACCHETTI Stanford … kirkby family office